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INTRODUCTION
In Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah
1984 ) f the Utah Supreme Court expressly held that it's ruling on
the constitutionality of § 59-5-109 (Supp. 1981) applied
prospectively only, except as to the six Rio Algom plaintiffs.
The Court made this ruling, in part, because of the undue
hardships to local governments if the ruling were applied to
pending actions, such as Kennecott's.

In addition, the Court

made this ruling after a conscious review of the law on the
propriety of limiting the retroactive effect of a ruling to the
parties•

The Rio Algom Court's analysis was correct at the time

and remains good law under current constitutional principles.
The only issue in the instant case is whether the District
Court properly ignored the Utah Supreme Court's express holding
and applied Rio Algom's ruling on the validity of § 59-5-109 to
Kennecott•
Kennecott defends the District Court's actions on three
grounds.

First, notwithstanding Rio Algom's explicit language to

the contrary, Kennecott contends that the Rio Algom Court did not
limit it's ruling to the plaintiffs in that case.

Second,

Kennecott seeks reversal of Rio Algom's prospectivity ruling and
the adoption of the approach suggested by two justices in James
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S.

, 111 S.Ct. 2439,

115 L. Ed* 2d 481 (1991), even though that approach is not
constitutionally mandated and is contrary to established Utah
precedent which creates a common sense framework for balancing
the hardships involved with retroactive rulings.

Finally,

Kennecott, without citing any relevant authority, asserts that
its due process and equal protection rights would be violated
unless this Court reverses Rio Alqom's prospectivity ruling.

As

discussed fully below, the Court should reject Kennecott's
challenges to Rio Alqom's prospectivity ruling and should reverse
the District Court's judgment ignoring that ruling.
I.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN RIO ALGOM CONSCIOUSLY AND
UNAMBIGUOUSLY REFUSED TO APPLY ITS HOLDING ON THE VALIDITY
OF § 59-5-109 TO CASES PENDING AT THE TIME OF THE RULING.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Rio Alqom Corp. v. San

Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) could not have used clearer
language in describing the retroactive effect of it's
invalidation of § 59-5-109.

The Court unambiguously and

unequivocally states that it's ruling was prospective only,
except as to the Rio Alqom plaintiffs.
is:

The pertinent language

"[W]e direct that our holding of unconstitutionality be

prospective . . . . As to the six plaintiff - taxpayers . . .,
this decision shall be retroactive for the year for which this
suit for refund was brought."

Id. at 196.* No fair, reasoned

reading of this language supports Kennecott's claim to the
benefits of the Rio Alqom holding.

Notwithstanding its

unequivocal holding, Kennecott claims that Rio Alqom "did not
address the situation of parties who, at the time of the
decision, had litigation pending challenging the
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109. . .."
1

Brief of

It is worth noting that the Rio Alqom plaintiffs could
only rely on the ruling for the 1981 tax year, "the year for
which this suit for refund was brought." Id.
2

Respondent pg. 15. To support this assertion, Kennecott suggests
that the Court relied upon cases which dealt with pure
prospectivity and which did not address the issue of the
retroactive application of a rule to pending cases.
Respondent pg. 16 & Note 4.

Brief of

The implication of this argument is

that the Court was confused about the nature of its holding as it
applied to pending cases.

Brief of Respondent pg. 15-16.

The Rio Alaom Court's thorough analysis of the factual and
legal basis for it's retroactivity holding belies any notion that
the Court was confused about the scope of its holding. The Court
specifically discussed the hardship on local government if its
ruling were applied to pending cases.

In addition, the Court

cited to cases where the holdings were limited to the parties
only and the Court highlighted those cases' prospectivity rulings
by parenthetically noting the importance of the holdings to the
Court's analysis.

Thus, the Rio Alqom Court's analysis makes

clear that the Court carefully and consciously chose to limit its
holding to the parties only.
The Court's analysis began with an assessment of the
potentially devastating effect on local government of
retroactively invalidating a tax statute, especially when the
ruling applied to assessments which were not yet final or which
were the subject of pending appeals.

Specifically, the Court

held:
Since 1981, a number of owners of state-assessed properties
have paid their taxes under protest or have filed formal
complaints with the Tax Commission. Retroactive effect to a
decision altering the relative tax burden between locally

3

assessed and state-assessed properties would require
reopening the assessment process as to tax obligations not
vet final. To the extent that this might result in refunds
of taxes paid on state-assessed properties, it would impose
indebtedness for future repayments from locally assessed
properties• Such indebtedness could be huge in counties
that derive high proportions of their budgets from stateassessed properties.
Id, at 195 (emphasis supplied).

Having identified the harsh

burdens associated with a retroactive ruling, the Court canvased
the law in other jurisdictions to determine whether it could
avoid these harsh results by giving its ruling prospective
application.

Based upon these authorities and the burden on

local governments, the Rio Alqom Court concluded that it's
holding should be given prospective effect.

Id. at 196.

The Court's analysis however was not completed.

The Court

was concerned that giving a ruling only prospective effect would
deprive "the litigants, who have sustained the burden of
attacking an unconstitutional statute, of the fruits of their
victory*"

1^.

at 196.2 Specifically, the Court was concerned

about prospective rulings discouraging challenges to statutes of
questionable validity.

Addressing these criticisms, the Court

determined to make its ruling prospective only, except as to the
parties, and held:
In response to these considerations, some decisions that
give only prospective effect to a holding of
unconstitutionality as to all other parties give the holding
retroactive effect as to the litigants or others who have
litigation pending. Stickland v. Newton County, supra (Gaparties only); Kansas City Millwright Co. v. Kalb, supra
2

The Court also noted that giving prospective effect only
made the Court's opinion an advisory opinion or dicta. .Id. at
196.
4

(Kan.-parties and others with action pending); Perkins v.
County of Albermarle, supra (Va.-parties only). . . . We
gave this kind of limited retroactive effect to a decision
that local government legislation was unconstitutional, a
decision that was otherwise prospective only. Carter v.
Beaver County Service Area No. One, 16 Utah 2d 280, 283, 399
P.2d 440, 442 (1965) .
Id. at 196 (emphasis supplied).

The Court then held that for the

same reasons expressed in these opinions, it's ruling should be
prospective only, except for the plaintiffs.
The Rio Algom Court's analysis of the retroactivity issue
establishes that it consciously chose to limit its ruling to the
parties and to exclude those with pending claims.

In its

discussion of the hardship of a retroactive ruling, it expressly
refers to the unfair burden on local governments if its
constitutionality ruling were applied retroactively to taxpayers
with pending claims. Again, in analyzing whether to give the Rio
Algom plaintiffs the benefit of the ruling, the Court cites to
cases which limited their ruling to the parties and
parenthetically noted that the rulings applied only to the
parties.3

These are the case which persuaded the Court of the

importance of rewarding the litigants and thereby encouraging
challenges to statutes of questionable validity.
The Court's ruling reflects a balance between the need to
reward litigants and the hardship of a retroactive ruling.
3

The

Kennecott quotes from the portion of the Rio Algom
decision which cites to cases applying rulings retroactively to
the parties only. Kennecott, however, deletes these citations
from it's block quote, thereby eliminating the parenthetical
references explaining that the holdings limited the retroactive
effect to the parties only. See Brief of Respondent at pg. 14.
5

Court addressed the first concern by giving the litigants the
benefit of the ruling.

It addressed the later issue by making

the ruling otherwise prospective and by refusing to apply it to
pending cases, even going so far as to limit the retroactive
effect for the litigants to one tax year.

The ruling thus must

be viewed as a carefully tailored response to a complex issue.
In light of the Rio Algom Court's careful consideration of
the issue of whether it's ruling should apply to pending cases,
the Court must reject Kennecott's contention that Rio Algom did
not address this issue.
II.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE RIO ALGOM OR
ABANDON UTAH'S COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO RETROACTIVITY.
Rio Algom and Utah's other retroactivity rulings provide a

wurkable frrn^work for balancing the competing interests involved
when a court declares a statute unconstitutional or makes a new
ruling.

This Court has effectively applied this analysis in a

number of situations.

The proven effectiveness of Utah's

approach to retroactivity strongly counsels against abandoning
it, especially in light of the current chaos in the United States
Supreme Court's opinions on this issue.

Fortunately, Utah is not

constitutionally mandated to follow the United States Supreme
Court's opinions in this area.
Kennecott urges this Court to reverse the prospectivity
approach adopted in Rio Algom and to rule that Utah courts may
never limit the retroactive effect of their rulings to the
parties only.

Brief of Respondent pg. 19 Note 6.

For support,

Kennecott cites the opinion of Justice Souter in James B. Beam
6

Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S.
L.Ed.2d 481 (1991).

, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115

This ruling was not constitutionally

mandated but was based on Justice Souter's views of the
principles of stare decisis and the rule of law generally.
The issue of whether this Court should adopt Justice
Souter's approach in Beam however should not be addressed in a
vacuum.

Rather, it must be considered in the light of

what, if any, limits the United States Constitution puts on state
court's retroactivity rulings and in the light of how the Utah
Supreme Court has effectively dealt with this issue in a number
of cases. With this background, a careful review of the current
disarray in the United State Supreme Court's opinions on
retroactivity will convince this Court not to abandon its time
tested approach to retroactivity.
A.

The United States Constitution Provides States With The
Freedom To Develop Retroactivity Rules Which Reflect That
State's Supreme Court's Judicial Philosophy.
Under the United States Constitution, state courts are

generally free to follow their own judicial philosophies in
determining the retroactive effect of their declarations of state
law.

More than a half century ago, Justice Cardozo described the

interrelationship between the federal constitution and state
retroactivity rules as follows:
We think the Federal constitution has no voice upon the
subject. A state in defining the limits of adherence to
precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle
of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may
say that decisions of its highest court, though later
overruled, are law none the less for intermediate
transactions. . . . On the other hand, it may hold to the
ancient dogma that the law declared by its courts had a
7

Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration,
in which event the discredited declaration will be viewed as
if it had never been, and the reconsidered declaration as
law from the beginning. . . . The choice for any state may
be determined by the luristic philosophy of the judges of
her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature.
We review not the wisdom of their philosophies, but the
legality of their acts.
Great Northern Railway Co, v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co,, 287
U.S. 358, 364-365 (1932)(emphasis supplied).
The Utah Supreme Court is thus free to develop its own rules
of retroactivity using "the juristic philosophy of the judges of
her courts,"

The United State Supreme Court's opinion on the

retroactive effect of that Court's rulings on federal law do not
bind this Court.

To the extent that this Court finds those

opinions persuasive, it may choose to adopt them as the law of
Utah.

However, Utah's law on retroactivity is not in need of

repair and would not benefit from an infusion of "juristic
philosophy" of other courts.
B.

Rio Algom And Other Utah Supreme Court Cases Create A
Rational, Workable Framework For Assessing The Competing
Retroactivity Interests.
The Utah Supreme Court's judicial philosophy is to approach

the retroactivity issue pragmatically.
question of judicial power,"

The issue "is not a

Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d

1023, 1025 (Utah 1991) and its resolution is not constrained by
constitutional limitations.

Loyal Order of Moose v. County Bd.

of Egualization, 657 P.2d 257, 264 (Utah 1982).

Rather, the

retroactive effect of a ruling depends "solely upon an appraisal
of the relevant judicial policies to be advanced."
8

Van Dyke,

supra, 818 P.2d at 1025.

The Court has described the factors

guiding the retroactivity analysis as follows:

"When we conclude

that there has been justifiable reliance on the prior state of
the law or the retroactive operation of the new law may otheirwise
create undue burden, the Court may order that the decision apply
only prospectively."

Id. at 1025. This balancing approach

permits the Court to assess fully the actual impact of its ruling
and to minimize any harshness/
Rio Alaom illustrates the effectiveness of Utah's
approach to the retroactivity issue.

In each case, the Court

faced the prospect of retroactively overturning a state statute
on which local governments had relied in serving their citizens.
The Court also faced litigants who had successfully challenged
Lhe statute and had some claim to the fruits of Lheir labors. By
balancing these interests and limiting its holding to the
parties, the Court was able to limit the undue burden of a
retroactive ruling, yet reward the litigants and thereby
encourage future challenges to questionable statutes.

4

An early example of Utah's realistic approach to
retroactivity is Carter v. Beaver County Service Area, 39 9 P.2d
440 (Utah 1965). There, the plaintiff challenged the creation of
the Beaver County service area claiming that the statute under
which it was created violated the Utah constitution by usurping
local governmental powers. The Court held the statute
unconstitutional but limited the retroactive effect of its ruling
to the parties only. Although not expressly stated, the Court
was apparently concerned about the potential disruptive effect of
a retroactive ruling invalidating service areas already created,
some of which may have partially completed their projects. By
limiting its ruling to the parties, the Court was able to tailor
its ruling to eliminate the hardship of a retroactive ruling.

9

C.

The Rationale Of Justice Souter's Opinion In Beam Does Not
Provide A Sufficient Basis For Utah To Abandon The Rio Algom
Approach To Retroactivity,
Kennecott urges the Court to reverse Rio Algom's

retroactivity ruling because it limited its holding to the
parties only.

Kennecott does not challenge the underlying

ruling's rationale which was to avoid the undue hardship of
retroactivity while not discouraging challenges to statutes of
questionable validity.

Instead, Kennecott offers the reasoning

of Justice Souter's opinion in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991).
Whatever confusion has arisen because of the United States
Supreme Court's seemingly irreconcilable opinions, no question
can

exist of their limited applicability to the issue of the

retroactive effect of state court decisions on state law.

First,

the Beam opinions concerned only the retroactive effect of
decisions establishing federal law.5

Second, none of the Beam

opinions suggests that the United States Constitution requires
state courts to adopt federal retroactivity analysis in cases
dealing with state law.6

As a result, the Utah Supreme Court is

5

This fact is made clear by Justice Souter whose opinion
stated that "the antecedent choice-of-law question is a federal
one where the rule at issue derives from federal law,
constitutional or otherwise" Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 488,
and who framed the issue as "whether it is error to refuse to
apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case
announcing the decision had already done so." Beam, supra, 115
L.Ed.2d at 491.
6

Justice Scalia relies on Article III of the United
States Constitution in finding that all federal court decisions
are automatically retroactive. Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed. 2d at 497.
Justice Souter on the other hand finds support for his rejection
10

not bound by these rulings but may adopt them as the law of Utah
to the extent it finds their reasoning persuasive.
The discussion that follows describes the analyses of the
Beam opinions.

It is divided into two parts.

The first part is

a brief discussion of two United State Supreme Court rulings
which help put the Beam opinions in prospective.

The second part

is a discussion of the conflicting rationales and approaches
evidenced by the separate opinions of Justices Scalia, Souter and
O'Connor in Beam.

This later part highlights how Justices

Scalia's and Souter's opinions,- which reject selective
prospectivity, are inconsistent with Utah's retroactivity law and
shows why they should not be adopted as the law in Utah.
1.

Equitable Considerations Have An Important Role In The
Uniw^d States Supreme Court's Rulings In Chevron Oil And
McKesson.
Before addressing Chevron Oil and McKesson, it is important

to distinguish between retroactivity as a choice-of-law issue and
retroactivity as a remedy issue.

The choice-of-law issue is

simply whether a new rule should apply to facts or cases which
arose before the new rule was declared.

Stated differently, the

issue is whether the court should choose to apply the new or old
rule.

When the new or old rule concerns federal law, the choice-

of-law issue is governed by federal law.

This aspect of

retroactivity is addressed in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97 (1971).
of selective prospectivity, in part, in the principles of stare
decisis and the rule of law without relying on the constitution.
Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed. 2d at 489.
11

The remedy aspect of retroactivity comes into play after the
court chooses to apply new law to the parties whose actions
occurred before the new ruling.

At that point, the court must

determine what remedy should govern the application of the new
law.

This aspect of the retroactivity analysis is addressed in

McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages, 496 U.S. 18/
110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990).
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Chevron Oil
addresses the question of whether a prior ruling concerning the
appropriate statute of limitations should be given retroactive
effect so as to bar the plaintiff's claim.7

In analyzing this

issue, the Court adopted a three part test:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must
establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear
past precedent on which the litigants may have relied, or by
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was
not clearly foreshadowed. Second, . . . [the court] must .
. . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to
the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect and whether retrospective operation will further or
retard its operation. Finally, [a court must] weigh the
inequity imposed by retroactive application, for where a
decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable
results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in
our cases for avoiding the injustice or hardship by a
holding on nonretroactivity.
Id. at 106-07 (emphasis supplied).

Applying this test, the Court

refused to apply the new rule to bar the plaintiff's claim
retroactively.

The analysis set forth in Chevron has been

7

Under the new rule, the plaintiff's claims would have
been barred before the new ruling was issued. Chevron Oil,
supra, 404 U.S. at 105.
12

followed in many federal cases and adopted by several state
courts.
In McKesson, the Court discuses the remedy aspect of the
retroactivity issue. McKesson was part of the litigation flowing
from the ruling in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263
(1984) that declared unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
state taxing statutes which preferred local business. After the
Bacchus ruling, Florida amended its statute making superficial
changes but effectively retaining the local preferences found
objectionable in Bacchus.

The plaintiff in McKesson challenged

the statute in Florida's state court.

The Florida Supreme Court

found the statute unconstitutional under Bacchus, granted
injunctive and declaratory relief, biv. refused to award a refund
for taxes paid under the new statute*
On appeal, Justice Brennan summarily disposed of the choiceof-law issue, i.e. whether the Florida Supreme Court's decision
declaring the tax unconstitutional should be applied
retroactively to taxes arising prior to that decision.

As

Justice Brennan noted regardless of which choice-of-law
approached applied, the Florida Supreme Court's decision applied
retroactively.

McKesson, supra, 110 L.Ed.2d at 32 Note 15.

Thus, there was no question that the taxes were collected
pursuant to a statute, unconstitutional as to the plaintiff.
Since Florida had collected a tax unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause, the McKesson Court addressed rememdy issue and
held that prospective relief did not satisfy federal law and the
13

state was required "to provide meaningful backward-looking relief
to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation,"

McKesson, supra,

110 L.Ed.2d at 32. The Court however made clear that the state
had some flexibility in fashioning a retrospective remedy.
McKesson, supra, 110 L.Ed.2d at 37-40.
2.

The Various Opinions In Beam Contain No Unifying Analysis
Which Justifies Reversing Rio Alqom.
The various opinions in Beam contain no unifying analysis

which justifies reversing Rio Alqom.

This is illustrated by

considering the rationales underlying the three approaches
championed by Justices Scaliaf Souter and O'Connor.

These

opinions describe the approaches offered in the various
opinions.8

8

In Beam, the justices issued five opinions none of
which garnered more than three justices support. Justice
Souter's opinion was joined by Justice Stevens. Justice White
wrote a concurring opinion. Justices Scalia and Blackmun wrote
separate concurring opinions in which they each joined the others
and in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice O'Connor wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy joined.
In American Trucking Assn's. v. Smith, 110 L.Ed.2d 148
(1990), the Court also addressed the choice-of-law retroactivity
issue. This case resulted in three opinions which for the most
part track the views expressed in Beam. Justice O'Connor wrote
the plurality opinion and was joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices White and Kennedy. Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment because of his disagreement with the substantive law
issues, not because of his opinion on retroactivity. He thereby
made Justice O'Connor's opinion the opinion of the Court.
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent in which Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun joined.
14

Beam, like McKesson, involves Bacchus's invalidation of
state tax laws under the Commerce Clause.9

However, unlike

McKesson, the challenged statute was enacted and the challenged
tax was paid before the Bacchus ruling.

The issue thus was

whether the Bacchus ruling should be applied retroactively to
make invalid a tax which had been valid when incurred.10
sharply divided Court determined that the Bacchus

A

decision

should be applied retroactively to invalidate the taxes incurred
before Bacchus was decided.11
a.

The Rationale For Automatic Retroactivity In All Cases
Exalts Theoretical Purity At The Expense of Litigants'
Reasonable Expectation Interests.
Justice Scalia, Marsh \1,

and Blackmun espouse the theory of

automatic retroactivity in all cases.

The rationale for this

approach is found in Article III of the United States
Constitution and these justices' philosophical beliefs about the
role of courts. According to this view, the judicial role is to
declare what the law already is; it is not to create the law.
9

In American Trucking, the taxpayer sought retroactive
application of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
American Trucking Association v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987)
which, like Bacchus, found a state statute invalid under the
Commerce Clause.
10

In American Trucking, the taxpayer also challenged taxes
arising after the Scheiner decision established the new rule.
All the Justices agreed that taxes arising after the Court's
ruling declaring the statute unconstitutional must be refunded.

11

In American Trucking, the Courtf in a plurality opinion
written by Justice O'Connor refused to retroactively apply the
ruling in Scheiner.
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Once this role is defined, Justice Scalia and those adopting his
view then easily conclude that all constitutional "declarations"
must be retroactive.

Justice Scalia reasoned as follows:

"Since

the constitution does not change from year to year; since it does
not conform to our decisions, but our decision are supposed to
conform to it; the notion that our interpretation of the
Constitution in a particular decision could take prospective form
does not make sense."

American Trucking Ass'n, supra, 110 L.Ed.

2d at 174-75 (Opinion of Justice Scalia).

Although courts

theoretically declare law, Justice Scalia concedes that "in a
real sense" courts make law.

Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 497.

However, to be consistent with the judicial role, Justice Scalia
believes that judges must make law "as chough they were 'binding'
it" even though this raises practical problems when precedents
are overruled.

Justice Scalia, however, finds these difficulties

to be a "one of the understood checks upon the judicial law
making power," since these difficulties make it harder to
overrule precedent.

Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 497.

In Rio Alqom, this Court rejected the theory that a law,
once declared unconstitutional, is void from its inception. Rio
Alqom, supra, 681 P.2d at 196. However the most telling critique
of Justice Scalia's view is Justice White's opinion in Beam.
Plainly enough, Justices Scalia, Marshall, and Blackmun
would depart from our precedents [including Chevron Pill.
Justice Scalia would do so for two reasons, . . . . First,
even though the Justice is not naive enough (nor does he
think the Framers were naive enough) to be unaware that
judges in a real sense "make" law, he suggest that judges
(in an unreal sense, I suppose) should never concede that
they do and must claim that they do no more than discover
16

it, hence suggesting that there are citizens who are naive
enough to believe them. Second, Justice Scalia, fearful of
our ability and that of other judges to resist the
temptation to overrule prior cases, would maximize the
injury to the public interest when overruling occurs, which
would tend to deter them from departing from established
precedent.
I am quite unpersuaded by this line of reasoning. . . .
Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 495.
This Court should also be unpersuaded by Justice Scalia's
unrealistic view of the role of judges and the real world costs
of changes in the law, costs which in some cases cannot be
avoided as courts' understanding of the law evolves, grows, and
improves.

As Justice White has noted, these costs may become so

high that absent a method by which courts can control the costs
by making rulings prospective, cases which ought to be overruled
may not be.

Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, 119 L.Ed.2d 91,

120 (1992)(White, J., Concuring in part and dissenting in part).
The real world requires a common sense approach to what courts
really do when they make law.
b.

Principles Of "Stare Decisis" And "Rule of Law" Do Not
Require An Abandonment Of Utah's Approach To Retroactivity.
Justice Souter's Beam opinion rejects the notion that a

ruling may never be retroactively applied to the parties only.
He bases this conclusion on the belief that limiting
retroactivity to the parties in civil cases is not necessary to
foster challenges to laws of questionable validity.

In addition,

Justice Souter believes that selective prospectivity is
inconsistent with stare decisis and the rule of law generally.
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Neither of these rationales constitutionally binds this Court,
nor should they persuade this Court to reverse Rio Algom.
Justice Souter's view of incentives is directly contrary to
this Court's view.

Justice Souter's position as expressed in

Beam is that selective prospectivity is not necessary as an
incentive because even purely prospective relief provides
sufficient incentive to a litigant to challenge the
constitutionality of questionable statutes.
When the Rio Algom Court addressed this issue, it reached
the opposite conclusion.

In Rio Algom, the Court first found

that the "new" rule should be applied prospectively because of
the hardships of a retroactive ruling.
considered the is,c

The Court however then

of incentives and found that selective

prospectivity fostered challenges to questionable statutes.
Justice Souter's opinion offers nothing new to refute the Rio
Algom analysis and his analysis of the incentives issue should be
rejected for the reasons set forth in Rio Algom.
Justice Souter's other rationale for rejecting selective
prospectivity is that it "breaches the principle that litigants
in similar situations should be treated the same, a fundamental
component of stare decisis and the rule of law generally."
supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 489.

Beam,

Justice Souter does not rely upon the

Equal Protection Clause for his position on equal treatment and
it apparently has its origin the opinions of Justice Harlan.
More importantly, he recognizes that even under his approach
similarly situated persons are treated differently.
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However, in

Justice Souter's view, the cost of providing equality in those
situations justifies disparate treatment that some might deem
arbitrary.

Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed,2d at 492-93.

The Court ought not accept Justice Souter's view of where
the retroactivity line should be drawn.

His view creates an

absolute rule prohibiting selective prospectivity and does not
permit the court to properly take into account the dual concerns
of protecting local governments from the harshness of retroactive
rulings and of rewarding litigants who successfully challenge a
law*
These dual concerns are not more evident than when a tax
statute is challenged.

In such a case, retroactive invalidation

will almost always cause huge hardships to l^>cal governments who
have collected and spent taxes in reliance on presumptively valid
statutes.

Litigants on the other hand would have little

incentive to challenge a statute if the prospects of a purely
prospective ruling were substantial.

The incentive for these

litigants would be simply to wait for someone else to incur the
expense of challenging a questionable statute.

Once the statute

is declared unconstitutional, all will benefit from the ruling
without incurring the risk or expense.12
12

Assuming arguendo that Justice Souter's equality
concerns justified the rejection of selective prospectivity,
which they do not, any ruling reversing Rio Alqom's retroactivity
analysis should be prospective only so as not to defeat the very
fairness and equality concerns espoused by Justice Souter.
Unlike the Court in Beam, this Court faces an earlier holding
which expressly limited the retroactive application of a ruling
to the parties for a specific tax year. Needless to say, many
taxpayers (including the Rio Alqom parties) and the courts have
19

c.

The Complexity Of Retroactivity Determinations Requires
The Application Of A Flexible Standard.
Justice O'Connor's discussion of the Chevron Oil

test shows that a careful consideration of the equities is
necessary to insure fairness.

First, Justice O'Connor notes: "If

Justice Souter is concerned with fairness, he cannot ignore
Chevron Oil; the purpose of the Chevron Oil test is to determine
the equities of retroactive application of a new rule."

She also

analyzes the stare decisis implications of the Chevron Oil test
and that a decision not to apply a law is consistent with stare
decisis•
A decision not to apply a new rule retroactively is based
on principles of stare decisis. By not applying the lawchanging decision retroactively, a court respects the
settled expectations that have built up around the old law.
If a Chevron Oil analybis reveals, as it does, that
retroactive application of Bacchus would unjustly undermine
settled expectations, stare decisis dictates strongly
against the Court's holding [that Bacchus be applied
retroactively].
Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 498, 499.

Based on the Chevron Oil

test, Justice O'Connor would have found that the Bacchus ruling
should not have been given retroactive effect in either Bacchus
or Beam.
Although Justice O'Connor did not address the issue of
whether selective prospectivity is consistent with Chevron Oil,

accepted Rio Alaom at face value and have not pursued or have
dismissed challenges to assessments which have now become finial.
The only difference between these persons and Kennecott is that
the former accepted the Rio Alqom's plain language limiting its
holding to the parties for a specific tax year. To avoid this
unfairness and unequal treatment, any rejection of selective
prospectivity should be prospective only.
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the Supreme Court of Colorado has confronted that issue in Martin
Marietta Corp, v. Lorenzo, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).

Prior to

Marietta, the Colorado Court of Appeals had recognized a public
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine and applied
the holding to the parties.

Cronk v. Intermountain Rural

Electric Ass'n., 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1988).

The issue

before the Colorado Supreme Court in the Marietta case was
whether persons whose cause of action arose before Cronk could
benefit from the ruling.

In addressing the applicability of the

Chevron Oil test to this issue after Beam, the Court first noted
Justice Souter's refusal to follow Chevron Oil and held:
In the instant case, we could employ Justice Souter's
analysis and conclude that, as a matter of state law, once a
new rule of substantive law, such as the Cronk rule, is
applied to litigants then before the court, it must be
applied to all others not barred by procedural requirements
or res judicata. We decline, however, to follow such a
course. Because we deal in this case with the issue of the
retroactive application of a state judicial decision
announcing a rule of tort law and not a rule deriving from
federal constitutional or statutory law, we continue to
adhere to the Chevron analysis in resolving the issue of
retroactive or prospective application of the state judicial
decision.
Id. at 112 Note 7.

Having rejected Justice Souter's analysis,

the Colorado Supreme Court weighed the equities under the Chevron
Oil test and found the new rule retroactive.
The Utah Supreme Court should also reject Justice Souter's
analysis and reaffirm its flexible retroactivity analysis found
in Rio Algom and followed in its other cases.

This analysis

permits the Court to assess fully the competing fairness, equity,
and policy interests at stake when a retroactivity issue arises.
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This analysis, more importantly, permits the Court to tailor its
ruling to the needs of a particular case without the unnecessary
limits and inflexibility which would come with the adoption of
automatic retroactivity or the rejection of selective
prospectivity.
III. THE APPLICATION OF RIO ALGOM'S RETROACTIVITY RULING DOES NOT
VIOLATE KENNECOTT'S DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS.
A.

Under McKesson, An Individuals Due Process Rights Are Not
Involved Until After The Court Determines That The "New" Law
Applies To The Individual's Actions.
Kennecott asserts that a refusal to give it the benefit of

Rio Alqom's invalidation of § 59-5-109 would violate Kennecott's
due process rights as described in McKesson.

That decision

however does not recognize a due process limitation on a court's
choice between applying an "old" lav. :>r applying a "new* law
retroactively.

In McKesson, there was no dispute that the "new"

law applied retroactively.

The only issue was what relief was

required to remedy the violation of the new law.
McKesson has no application here, because it deals with
remedy, not choice-of-law issues.

In the instant case, the "new"

law is Rio Alqom's invalidation of § 59-5-109 and it does not
apply to Kennecott because the Court limited its ruling to the
parties only.

Since this "new" rule does not apply to Kennecott,

§ 59-5-109 was valid as to Kennecott for the years prior to Rio
Alqom and remedy is not an issue.
For these same reasons, Smith v. Travis County Education
District, 791 F. Supp. 1170 (W.D. Tx 1992) vacated on other
grounds 968 F.2d 453 (Cir. 5 1992) also has no application here.
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It should however be noted that Travis dealt with the issue of
whether due process required a state to give taxpayers a remedy
for taxes collected after a statute was declared
unconstitutional.

The Court specifically noted that no due

process violations existed as to taxes incurred before the
statute was declared unconstitutional.
Supp. at 1201.

Travis, supra, 791 F.

Since Kennecott's tax liability was incurred

before Rio Alaom invalidated the statute, Travis stands for the
proposition that Kennecott's tax payment does not violate the Due
Process Clause.
A.

Kennecottrs Equal Protection Rights Are Not Violated By Rio
Alqom's Retroactivity Ruling.
Kennecott claims that its equal protection rights are

violated by Rio Alqom's retroactivity ruling.

Kennecott supports

this proposition by citing Justice Souter's opinion in Beam.
However, Justice Souter's references to equality of treatment
were not founded on the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution but rather found their origins in the
principles of "stare decisis and the rule of law generally."
Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 489. Thus, Justice Souter's opinion
does not support Kennecott's equal protection claims and the
other cases cited by Kennecott do not address the equal
protection implications, if any, of rulings limiting the
retroactivity application of new laws.
In addition, Kennecott's equal protection claim cannot
withstand close factual scrutiny.

As a threshold matter,

Kennecott is not treated differently from the Rio Alqom
23

plaintiffs.

Under the Rio Algom ruling, the plaintiffs were

limited to challenging their taxes for 1981 and were not
permitted to use the invalidation of § 59-5-109 to challenge
assessments for subsequent years. Thus, the Rio Algom
plaintiffs, like Kennecott in the instant case, can not use Rio
Algom's invalidation of the statute to challenge their 1983
taxes.

In other words, for the 1983 tax year, Kennecott is

treated the same as the Rio Algom plaintiffs.
More importantly, Kennecott has failed to prove that any
difference in treatment between Kennecott and the Rio Algom
plaintiffs is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
purpose.

The Rio Algom Court set forth in some detail the

reasons why its ruling was prospective only, except for the
parties.

Kennecott has not sustained its burden of showing that

these reasons are not legitimate governmental purposes or that
the classification drawn are not reasonably related to those
purposes.

Without such a showing, Kennecott's equal protection

claim must fail.
DATED this

day of November, 1992.
PAUL VAN DAM
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